Next generation tactical systems including Blue Force Tracking (BFT), Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW)-based and Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW)-based Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), tactical unattended wireless sensors networks, and distributed electronic warfare (EW) systems, rely heavily on the global positioning system (GPS) for time synchronization and basic operation. These networks are highly susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. GPS spoofing attack is a technique by which a GPS receiver is tricked into trusting fake GPS signals. Actual GPS signals are fairly weak satellite signals that provide a GPS node with it coordinates.
A typical technique used by malicious entities is to reproduce another fake GPS signal in the vicinity of the victim GPS node. The GPS node, upon receiving this fake signal determines it is an authentic satellite signal and updates its localization or time information. Thus, GPS spoofing is a covert attack that has severe consequences. Since GPS receivers cannot detect fake GPS signals, they can be fooled into tracking erroneous data. In 2003, researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrated the capacity for an adversary to launch GPS spoofing attacks using commercially available GPS simulators.
Recently, researchers at Cornell University developed a portable civilian GPS spoofing device and demonstrated how a GPS receiver can easily be fooled or spoofed. In effect, simulator nodes that can reproduce GPS signals are readily available for sale in the commercial market. Known methods for combating such attacks include spoofing counter measures based on GPS signal characteristics and multi-antenna array GPS defense.
Unfortunately, anti-spoofing based on GPS signal strength measurement fails to detect sophisticated GPS spoofing devices that mimic signal characteristics of the GPS. A multi-antenna array works well only in static GPS receivers but not in dynamic environments where the GPS receiver is mobile. In addition, multi-antenna GPS array are costly and require greater size, weight and power (SwaP) needs.
The current art is not sufficiently robust in terms of reliability and effectiveness since the detection technique relies on properties of the GPS signal or is optimized to mitigate a GPS spoofing attack on static GPS receivers. Other techniques operate to detect a GPS spoofing attack using a signal received at a remote site as a reference. In general, in the current art decision is based on a single instance of protocol violation. The mitigation technique, in the current art, is effective protecting static GPS receivers against GPS spoofing attacks. Therefore, such techniques are generally ineffective against attacks on body or vehicle mounted GPS receivers where the environment is dynamic.
Accordingly, there is a need in the art for methods and systems adapted for detecting GPS spoofing attacks in both static and dynamic settings. There is a further need for such methods and systems requiring minimum amount of information, both content and observation time, for convergence in order to provide reliable detection and mitigation of GPS spoofing attacks.